What Sisi Told Ammar Ali Hassan in June 2011: Book Review

 In June 2011, Dr. Ammar Ali Hassan received a call from Major General Mohamed al-Assar, inviting him to a meeting at the Triumph Hotel along with other public figures. On the way, Dr. Ammar recalled his conversations with the soldiers standing around the tanks in Tahrir Square before Mubarak stepped down.

Ammar asks them: What orders did you receive?

"To protect vital facilities and citizens."

"Do you have orders to disperse the demonstrations by force?"

They answer no.

"And if you were given such orders, what would you do?"

They said quite simply: "We won't carry them out."

"Why?"

"Because you are our brothers, and we are with you in your demands."

At the meeting, Dr. Ammar found Dr. Hossam Eissa and the writer Mohamed el-Makhzangi, and they were later joined by the TV presenter Reem Maged. As soon as he arrived, Major General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi told him: "First of all, we will hand over power to civilians."

In his book "I Lived What Happened" ("Ishtu Ma Jara"), published in the "Writings of the Revolution" series by the General Authority for Cultural Palaces, a small book of 230 pages in a small format, the researcher and writer Dr. Ammar Ali Hassan recounts his testimony on the events that followed January 25. The author was present at, and took part in, many behind-the-scenes episodes about which we know little. This makes the book, by an author who holds a doctorate from the Faculty of Economics and Political Science and has written many books spanning literature, politics and religion, one of the most prominent works chronicling the events of the Egyptian revolution.

[Caption:] Cover of the book "I Lived What Happened"

Ammar Hassan took part in the activities of the Kefaya movement, founded in 2004, which broke many barriers in the Mubarak era. It organized numerous demonstrations that were not large in number, but whose impact appeared later, when the movement moved beyond the "downtown" area and the protests extended to popular neighborhoods such as "Sayyida Zeinab" and "Shubra," winning some sympathy from the public. After a certain lull in the Kefaya movement, the "National Association for Change" was formed under the leadership of Mohamed ElBaradei, and Dr. Ammar was a member of its general secretariat.

Three days before January 25, Dr. Ammar took part in a seminar to discuss a book by the media adviser of the Muslim Brotherhood. At the seminar, Essam el-Erian declared that the Brotherhood would not take part in the January 25 demonstrations because no one had invited them. Ammar Ali Hassan replied: "It is not a wedding party or a banquet for the Brotherhood to wait for an invitation, and their non-participation would amount to negligence and silence in the face of an unjust ruler." As he left the seminar, a group of young Brotherhood members told him they would participate without waiting for the position of the Guidance Office. Two days later, el-Erian told him that the group had not taken an official position on participation, but would not prevent its members from participating personally.

Dr. Ammar Ali Hassan's memories of the Brotherhood go back to before that date. In 2010, Dr. Ammar met Essam el-Erian to congratulate him on his release from detention, and when he suggested that the Brotherhood join the National Association for Change, el-Erian's answer was: "The Brotherhood is more than eighty years old, and it is not reasonable for it to merge into a new entity with no substance, which many view as more of a joke than a serious undertaking."

When he proposed the same thing to Saad el-Katatni, his answer was that the balance of power on the ground was not in favor of the National Association. The author explains these positions by what he learned of a deal between the National Democratic Party and the Brotherhood, under which they would get 20 seats in the 2010 parliament instead of the 88 seats they had won in the 2005 parliament. Those meetings took place in the office of an intellectual close to the Brotherhood and in the State Security apparatus. However, the state's reneging on this agreement pushed the Brotherhood to join the signature-collection campaign launched by ElBaradei.

There are many places where the book attacks the Muslim Brotherhood, even though it was published during their time in power, in 2013. Ammar Ali Hassan devotes part of the book to attacking the Brotherhood's constitution (2012), which was approved. But a large part of this attack seems justified by the many positions the Brotherhood took during the revolution that angered the other forces. Likewise, the Brotherhood's reneging on the promises they made before the presidential runoff was a reason for the (civilian) opposition forces uniting against them.

Aside from the Brotherhood, Dr. Ammar shows that the statements that emerged after January 25 from some members of Mubarak's regime, such as "We are all remnants (felool)" and "We were all silent," are not true, for there were those who refused to cooperate with the regime. He recounts his personal experience when he was attending the "Arab Reform Conference," where Dr. Mohamed Kamal, his colleague at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, made him a private offer to join the Policies Secretariat of the National Democratic Party, to benefit from his sober pen in serving Egyptian culture. When Dr. Ammar told him that he considered this a betrayal of the toiling masses and the poor whose money had paid for his education, Mohamed Kamal replied that he could serve those poor people by reforming the country and reforming the National Democratic Party. Ammar Ali Hassan considered this self-deception, since it is the regime that uses intellectuals for its own benefit, a position that was supported by Dr. Osama al-Ghazali Harb.

The Revolution

The author recounts that he moved with a flood of people, joined by more from the side streets, amid chants such as "We won't fear your father, Gamal... our loud voice shakes mountains," as the crowd moved off from in front of the "Salah al-Din" mosque, while the thugs looked on at them in weakness and submission because of the huge numbers.

January 25, 2011 arrives, and Dr. Ammar takes part in the demonstrations on Qasr al-Aini Street, but they fall back because of tear gas and armored vehicles, and the demonstrators scatter. They then re-enter from the Corniche side and reach the Square amid the smiles of police officers, who seemed to be setting a trap for the demonstrators. But the growing numbers, which exceeded expectations, meant that the demonstrators gathered in Tahrir Square until nightfall. The first statement of the revolution was issued at ten o'clock at night and read by Dr. Abdel Galil Mostafa, demanding that Mubarak and his son not run in the coming elections, the dissolution of all elected councils, the lifting of the emergency law, and the formation of a national salvation government.

Everyone was enthused by the Tunisian revolution, which forced (Ben Ali) to leave. But forty minutes after midnight, Central Security soldiers began an attack, accompanied by sound bombs and smoke grenades, and the sit-in protesters dispersed, but there was another appointment to return.

Friday, January 28 began with the cutting of the mobile and internet networks, which indicated that there was great fear of something huge that could happen.

Dr. Ammar headed to the "Salah al-Din" mosque in the Manial district, a mosque known for the historical dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood over it. This suggested to the author that the mosque would witness a large demonstration launching from it, especially since he had seen young people belonging to the group in Tahrir Square on the 25th. But the mosque's preacher focused his sermon on the verse "Obey God and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you," and described the demonstrations as "sedition (fitna)," prompting Dr. Ammar to shout at him "Shame on you," in violation of the rules of listening to the Friday sermon.

When the prayer ended, there were three Central Security trucks and dozens of soldiers, so people dispersed and Dr. Ammar headed to Manial Street, where he saw a group of Egyptians sitting at a café sipping tea and coffee, smoking shisha and playing backgammon, while on the other side he saw a group of thugs with thick sticks in their hands. He asked himself, "Have the people let us down?" But from the heart of this dramatic scene, a crowd appeared before his eyes coming from "al-Basha" Square, a stream of people, and Dr. Ammar said to himself, "They did not let us down."

The author recounts that he moved with a flood of people, joined by more from the side streets, amid chants such as "We won't fear your father, Gamal... our loud voice shakes mountains," as the crowd moved off from in front of the "Salah al-Din" mosque, while the thugs looked on at them in weakness and submission because of the huge numbers. The captain standing with the soldiers was forced to open the way for the demonstrators after consulting a higher-ranking officer by radio, and so the terrible battle took place on "Qasr al-Aini" Street: batons, grenades, shields and armored vehicles, smoke, water, brutal beatings and near-death by suffocation, and onions, vinegar, water bottles and Coca-Cola thrown from balconies to counter thirst and gas.

Two hours of repelling and counterattacking, then a sudden withdrawal of the soldiers, and the marchers entered the Square under the slogan "The people want the fall of the regime." The 18 days of the revolution went by, between attempts at compromise solutions through the "Committee of Wise Men," which the youth of the Square rejected, and the maneuvers of the Muslim Brotherhood, which accepted a meeting with Major General Omar Suleiman to keep all lines open with all parties, and the "Battle of the Camel," in which Mubarak's supporters used swords, camels, horses, clubs and sharpened broken ceramic. Many took part in the fight, and the Ultras youth fought bravely, together with Brotherhood youth, until this phase ended with Mubarak's stepping down and the Military Council taking over power from him.

Meeting the Generals

Dr. Ammar mentions that the faces of the two generals turned pale when he demanded the formation of a presidential council made up of three civilians and two military members, and that the two generals neither mentioned nor acknowledged "revolutionary legitimacy," though they spoke of a partnership between the army and the revolution.

Dr. Ammar's impression was that the generals regarded what happened on January 25 as merely an uprising that relieved them of the succession (tawrith) scenario, and that the generals' position toward the youth was: "You made a great revolution, thank you, go back to your homes and we will manage everything." Yet Dr. Ammar's conversation with al-Sisi, head of Military Intelligence and member of the Military Council, in June 2011, indicated that the popular revolution had also protected the army, just as the army had helped protect the people.

Ammar said to al-Sisi: "The security forces were many times our number and were defeated by the people, even though they were trained for street confrontations."

Al-Sisi replied: "Mubarak made the security forces a parallel army, lacking only tanks and aircraft."

Ammar said to him: "He was preparing this parallel army to protect the succession process, and had you expressed a categorical rejection of his son Gamal coming to power, those security forces would have confronted you."

Al-Sisi nodded in agreement while Dr. Ammar continued:

"This means that the great revolution saved everyone from this catastrophic scenario."

Al-Sisi replied: "Thank God."

The meeting, which included several writers in addition to Major Generals Mohamed al-Assar and al-Sisi, saw many proposals that the Military Council did not implement. Dr. Ammar mentions that the faces of the two generals turned pale when he demanded the formation of a presidential council of three civilians and two military members, and that the two generals neither mentioned nor acknowledged "revolutionary legitimacy," though they spoke of a partnership between the army and the revolution, which Dr. Ammar described as the "dissenting partner" theory. When he expressed his fears about a confrontation between the army and the people, Major General al-Sisi reassured him that this day would never come, and that the value of the armed forces' "cohesion" would be destroyed by such a confrontation.

In October 2011, Dr. Ammar met two air force non-commissioned officers whom he gave a ride from Suez to Cairo. Through the conversation he learned that the Military Council had conducted a poll within the ranks of the armed forces between January 25 and February 11 on the possibility of the army intervening. The result showed an overwhelming majority sided with the people and against any violent intervention to disperse the demonstrations. Yet after Mubarak stepped down, the Military Council was lax in dissolving the local councils and confronting members of the National Democratic Party, so Dr. Ammar told General Sami Anan at one of the meetings he held with writers and experts:

"You are part of the counter-revolution."

Down with Military Rule

On the second day of the demonstrations, which Dr. Ammar considered a second revolutionary wave, the author called Essam el-Erian to invite him to join the demonstrations or at least to stop attacking the revolutionaries, but el-Erian's reply was: "Our assessments are different, and we will not participate, because it is a conspiracy to postpone the parliamentary elections."

Dr. Ammar describes the "Mohamed Mahmoud" massacre, which took place in November 2011, as pivotal and telling. He went down to Tahrir with those who went after he saw on television Central Security soldiers kicking a young man and throwing him onto the garbage. The Square filled up, and Military Police forces intervened with sound bombs, gas grenades, rubber bullets and relentless beating with batons, so the demonstrators retreated toward Qasr al-Nil Bridge, and the chant "Down, down with military rule" was born, roaring after having been said in whispers.

On the second day of the demonstrations, which Dr. Ammar considered a second revolutionary wave, he called Essam el-Erian to invite him to join the demonstrations or at least to stop attacking the revolutionaries, but el-Erian's reply was: "Our assessments are different, and we will not participate, because it is a conspiracy to postpone the parliamentary elections." The Brotherhood benefited from that wave when the Military Council announced a date for the presidential elections. And as demonstrators were being killed, Dr. Ammar was demanding, in his appearances on satellite channels, that Field Marshal Tantawi be tried on charges of killing demonstrators, as Mubarak was.

On the third day of the "Mohamed Mahmoud" wave, the youth of the "ElBaradei Campaign" were pressing him insistently to accept the premiership of the cabinet, while he remained silent, answering only with a smile of refusal. At the National Association meeting, after ElBaradei met with Lieutenant General Sami Anan, the information was that Field Marshal Tantawi rejected ElBaradei taking the post. When they tried to put the matter to the Square in order to build pressure by proposing ElBaradei as prime minister with two deputies, Dr. Hossam Eissa and Dr. Abu al-Fotouh, the Square was divided, which happened often and weakened the revolutionary force. Dr. Ammar believes that there were forces feeding these divisions: on one side, the forces of the former regime and its security apparatuses, and on the other, the Muslim Brotherhood, which benefited from the divisions in order to reap the rewards.

Dr. Ammar cites two incidents as evidence of the Brotherhood's opportunism. The first was before the revolution, during the meetings of the National Association for Change: the agreement was that, if Mubarak fell, the starting point would be drafting the constitution, which the Brotherhood violated. The second was when the political forces prepared the election law so that seats would be split equally between "individual" and "list" systems, to prevent challenges to the election results. The Brotherhood objected, and the ratio was changed to one-third and two-thirds, with party candidates allowed to run for the individual seats, which later led to the dissolution of the parliament.

The Revolutionary Candidate

Ammar Ali Hassan points out that there was an effect of the old student rivalry between Hamdeen Sabahi and Abu al-Fotouh.

Dr. Ammar joined the "Committee of One Hundred," whose goal was to set specific criteria for uniting behind a candidate from the revolutionary current, on the condition that he be competent and have a strong chance of winning the election. The idea was to persuade one of the candidates with the best chances, so the committee tried to convince Hamdeen Sabahi and Abdel Moneim Abu al-Fotouh that one of them should step aside in support of the other, with an announcement that he would be named vice president once the other candidate won.

The election itself proved the importance of this proposal, as the two candidates combined received more votes than Mohamed Morsi and Ahmed Shafik. When the committee met Abu al-Fotouh, he was expected to be the chosen candidate, but he asked the committee about Hazem Salah Abu Ismail and whether he could be included in the presidential team. The committee was not persuaded, as Abu Ismail was far from its way of thinking. Abu al-Fotouh, meanwhile, was seeking the votes of the Salafis and Abu Ismail's supporters, and at the same time feared that an alliance with Sabahi would affect the Islamist votes he was pursuing. Sabahi, for his part, was diplomatic and did not give a clear answer, whether accepting or rejecting the idea.

Ammar Ali Hassan notes that there was an effect of the old student rivalry between him and Abu al-Fotouh, which seemed to still linger in people's minds. Strangely, none of the three candidates with the lowest chances (Counselor al-Bastawisi, Abu al-Ezz al-Hariri, and Khaled Ali) responded to the idea and withdrew; instead they stayed in the presidential race until the end, so an important and influential opportunity was lost.

Dr. Ammar Ali Hassan's book "I Lived What Happened" is a testimony full of many important details, especially as we are living in an atmosphere of flagrant falsification of history, built on fabricated narratives supported only by their repetition and by the space made for them, until they create ever more illusion about what happened and what will happen.

Book: "I Lived What Happened" ("Ishtu Ma Jara")
Ammar Ali Hassan
Series: "Writings of the Revolution"
General Authority for Cultural Palaces, 2013

Published on Al-Manassa website, March 14, 2017